The Spanish Jungian scholar Adres Ortiz-Oses has gone a
bit further with our notion of language itself as empathic, as language always
already accomplishes in his understanding so much of what it tragically fails
to do in Kristeva’s. Where Kristeva posits semiotic and symbolic as two halves
of language whose fracture disrupts the self, Ortiz-Oses posits desdoblamiento instead.
This Spanish term describes the ubiquitous dual nature
of the universe as simultaneous actuality and ideality as understood by the
human mind. It thus gives us sentido, truth-sense, as the consequent
overloading of words with meaning which far outstrips their logical
signification. So words which cognitively denote one thing rationally and
verbally connote far more, and express far more, in their emotional, non-vocal
symbolic connotation.
That such meaning is Jungian and archetypal in
Ortiz-Oses’s understanding matters less for these essays than that that meaning
is as present, saturating, and expressive as much as it is unacknowledged. The
problem, then, is not that we may fail to join affect to cognition in language,
but that we will fail to realize our essentially reconciling position in the universe.
“Man is not the measure,” writes Ortiz-Oses,
“but is the mediation of all things.” Through sentido, language is always already present not as the failure of
human beings to communicate, to empathize, but as the only means by which such
understanding ever happens.
If Ortiz-Oses were to answer our question as to why the
Bible, one can imagine him responding “because He had to.” The God of
Ortiz-Oses is the God of maximal involvement, and language is that which involves
us in the universe. So, unfortunately for more traditional thinkers, in
Ortiz-Oses God and the universe end up seeming very much the same.
Perhaps a more particular example will suffice to
conclude our survey. It is no accident that in her work Schneiders borrows Paul
Riceour’s unfolding of linguistic sense and reference. In this schema, “sense
refers to the propositional integrity of the sentence,” while “reference is the
proposition’s claim to reach reality.” Meaning, in the linguistic sense, occurs
in the dialectic between them.
Fittingly enough for our study, Schneiders uses the
example of the parable of the Good Samaritan being sensical in and of itself
but meaningful only as Jesus uses it to explain the love commandment. Of course
we can ask historical questions about the parable, notes Schneiders, and we
must, but its full imaginative
meaning only occurs in conjunction with the commandment.
Its meaning for us is what it means for Jesus as the
New Testament itself understand him, how the text allows us to imagine it
fitting into Christ’s moral and spiritual world. This would be the beginnings
of a Christian reading of Scripture with both the tensive and empathic qualities
of language in mind.
In Riceour, the reader, through interpretation, reconciles the logical denotation of the parable of the Good Samaritan within its affective, emotional context by understanding the parable as the text imagines Jesus understanding it. The successful reader incorporates the holistic symbolic world the New Testament is in the business of creating through its language.
That world, the reality that the New Testament has Jesus imagining as the kingdom of God, and which Paul refigures as the new family and polis of the Christian church, is what human healing looks like. It is what our empathy with the world of the Bible is to help us understand.
But we are a long way from knowing any such paradise. To get there, to arrive at any such place, we must find ourselves transformed. How interpretation might occasion this, and do so comprehensively, will be the subject of our final essays.
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