The trouble is
that not all Scripture can be interpreted in love - at least not simply so. Some Scripture has nothing obvious
to do with love, such as those narratives of the Old Testament about the
destruction of peoples or cruelty and violence against women.
We are not the
first people to notice this. The Augustinian solution, and the solution for
many ancient readers of Scripture, was allegory, the strict substitution of a
historical reality (ie the Church) for a metaphorical figure (ie the beloved)
in a text (ie the Song of Songs). This can change the meaning of whole passages
of Scripture, so that the Song of Songs, in perhaps the most famous example, becomes
not a series of poems about the erotic love between man and woman but about the
chaste love between the soul and the Church. With sufficient work along these
lines, even the most inscrutable passages of Scripture can build up the love of
God and neighbor.
Now obviously
we today have some objections to this. It seems too disregarding of much of the
realities of the texts themselves. It’s hard to imagine that when Christ
instructed his disciples on the double commandment of love, he desired them to
interpret allegorically those passages of Scripture which did not openly
support Christian charity.
Today, the best of our first-tier interpretive
criteria, gained through many hundreds of years of scholarship, strive to embrace
the contents of texts in a more straightforward manner. So we might say that
both Christ and Matthew wanted their disciples to understand love as a way of
living in the world that both demanded sacrifice and promised reward in the
form of the Kingdom of God – or something along those lines. The point is that
where the text itself seems more fluid, ambiguous or complex, we now try to
bring our understanding of that text to the same level.
But there is a
deeper problem with Augustine. For him, the point of Christian doctrine was
that all things must point to the Trinitarian love of God, which sounds great
generally but has very specific problems. Ultimately, Augustine would have had
the signa, the sign that is Scripture
be enjoyed only as a means to (usus casui)
the enjoyment of the res, the thing,
of God for God’s own self (usus frui).
And we are going to have the same problem with this that we do with allegory:
not all things do point directly to
the Trinitarian love of God. We feel that many things are good simply in and of
themselves as gifts of God. Song of Songs, for example, truly seems to be
primarily poetry about erotic love, which makes the encouragement of erotic
love the simplest explanation for why we have it.
We don’t
think, and shouldn’t have to think, about the selfless love of the Trinitarian
God every time we kiss our beloved, or every time we eat a bowl of cereal. At
some point, such considerations actually end up diminishing the quality of
things as gifts. This is one of the
wisdoms of the Reformation: we are saved in creation as we are and where we are,
not through some ascetic contemplation that values only the pure love of God
and nothing in between.
It’s not only our final destination that matters. Even
within the Augustinian scheme of loving God and neighbor it surely becomes
problematic if we love our neighbor solely
because doing so leads us to love our God for the sake of our own salvation. Actually,
that doesn’t end up sounding like love at all.
Now this may
well be a bad reading of Augustine. I don’t know. Almost anyone has read him more
thoroughly than I. But if my reading is correct, then Augustinian
interpretation needs a measure of correction. It seems too theoretically
simple, too abstract, too weighted toward eternity to allow us to understand
the Scriptures in the best way that we are able. It passes far too quickly over
many urgent interpretive criteria.
What about historical context? What about
the culture of the reader and the imagination of the author? What about textual
form and grammatical structure? A less cohesive, unified understanding of
interpretation would allow us to honor the diverse details the texts themselves
actually consider. We must attend to the complexities, multiplicities and
intrinsic qualities of the Christian scripture that we have.
Because of its position on the second tier of interpretive criteria, salutary force
may allow us to do precisely this. Healing, like Scripture itself, is set
clearly and primarily in this world. And healing, like interpretation itself,
is judged primarily in retrospect: this interpretation has healed, this
fractured bone has mended.
My own argument is similarly retrospective:
interpretations which have healed have hewed more closely to Scripture’s
content, form, and transformative purpose than those that have not. (It is only
with practice that our judgments will improve: this way of reading a text is
often helpful, I can tell by looking at it that this cut is on the mend.) Healing
is no excuse, no end-around a Biblical text itself.
That Augustine
may have allowed for just such an end-around in his interpretive practice is no
excuse for us to do so in ours. Salutary force commits us to the contents of
Scripture. If the truth is going to set us free, surely we must first know the
truth, or be known by it. Only by being faithful to texts will all our various
psychological, linguistic, and historical studies of Scripture carry through
the understanding that heals. Only by being true to our understanding of
Scripture will our explication of Scripture lead us toward the transformation
which God intends to impart. Only if it springs from fidelity to the given
words of Scripture will salutary force be a viable, additional criterion
for determining the validity of Christian interpretations of Scripture.